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“Should the United States Collect Intelligence on its Close Allies?” 
Abstract 
The United States does not collect intelligence against all countries with the same intensity. 
Members of the so-called Five Eyes alliance—the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, 
Australia, and New Zealand— are believed to be excluded, and allegedly so is the United Arab 
Emirates. Should this policy continue in today’s unpredictable and fast-changing geopolitical 
environment?  
The Five Eyes alliance has given the United States an unmatched level of integration with its allies 
by increasing intelligence sharing between its members—but does this mean the United States 
should still not collect intelligence on them? Especially now that the UAE has allegedly been added 
to this short list, there are critics who claim that not collecting intelligence on these countries is 
creating a dangerous and possibly expanding knowledge gap—that America is missing out on 
critical pieces of intelligence.  
The United States does, however, collect on other “allies.” It has been caught spying on Germany’s 
Chancellor, Angela Merkel, on French companies who were allegedly supplying nuclear hardware 
to Iran, on the pro-Russian government Austria (NATO member), on Turkey, and on Israel. There 
are arguably instances where intelligence collection on these allies has been critical—for example, 
intelligence on the 9/11 hijackers who planned their attacks while they were in Germany, or 
allegations that Turkey may be backing elements within the Islamic State.  
Is the United States subverting its national security interests by not collecting on its close allies 
overseas, and now, allegedly, the UAE? 
Introduction 
Concordant definitions of the key terms in this paper is vital for understanding its overall argument. 
For the purposes of this paper, “Intelligence collection” is referring to the process of gathering 
information within or outside of the United States that involves threats to the US’ national security, 
homeland security, its people, its property, and/or its interests.1 This paper will be focusing 
primarily on one of the six major types of intelligence collection—human intelligence, or  
“HUMINT,” which is any intelligence gathered from a human source. HUMINT collection obtains 
a type of intelligence which other collection techniques cannot— intentions.  
An “ally” is widely known as a person, group, or nation that is associated with another or others 
for some common cause or purpose2. Pulling from this definition, a “close ally” of the US can be 
outlined as a country that has similar interests to and is in close cooperation with the US. These 
countries’ economic and political systems tend to mirror that of the US’ and share a common 
historical history. 
There is no known existing definition for a “close intelligence ally.” However, for the purposes of 
this paper, a close intelligence ally of the US will be defined as a country that falls into a 
classification of either the Five Eyes Alliance, the 9 Eyes Alliance, or the 14 Eyes Alliance. The 
different levels of alliances designate the amount of intelligence shared between those countries. 
                                                            
1 “What Is Intelligence?” Office of the Director of National Intelligence, ODNI, www.dni.gov/index.php/what-we-
do/what-is-intelligence. 
2 “Allies.” Dictionary.com, Dictionary.com, www.dictionary.com/browse/allies. 
Intelligence Alliances 
The Five Eyes Alliance 
The Five Eyes Alliance was forged immediately following World War II in 1946, originally just 
between the United States and the United Kingdom. Its purpose was to continue intelligence-
sharing efforts between the two countries, which had intensified in the context of their alliance in 
World War II.3 The agreement eventually expanded to include three other countries: Canada, 
Australia, and New Zealand. All five members of the alliance are English-speaking and have 
similar political systems. The term “Five Eyes” stems from the “US/AUS/CAN/NZ/UK Eyes 
Only” classification level that was traditionally used to specify which countries had access to their 
information.4 
The Five Eyes alliance was put in place to facilitate sharing of signals intelligence (SIGINT) 
among its members. Through the alliance, the member countries are allegedly expected to 
exchange critical SIGINT as well as the methods and techniques related to the SIGINT operations.5 
Even though the existence of this alliance is widely known, most of its details and inner workings 
remain highly classified. An illustrative example of the secrecy surrounding the Five Eyes Alliance 
is that the Office of the Prime Minister in Australia was not aware of it until 1973, nearly 30 years 
after the original deal was struck. The alliance itself did not become public knowledge until 2005, 
and was only officially acknowledged in 2010, when the text of the original UKUSA Agreement 
                                                            
3 National Archives. “Homepage.” The National Archives. The National Archives, June 13, 2008.  
4 ODNI Home. Accessed October 10, 2019. 
5Cox, James. “Canada And the Five Eyes Intelligence Community” Internet Archive, December 1, 2012. 
was released by the British and American governments.6 
Under the agreement, each country conducts collection operations and analyses in their respective 
parts of the world. The countries’ specified areas are not publicly known, but there is speculation 
that: the UK is mainly responsible for Europe, Western Russia, and the Middle East; the United 
States oversees the Middle East, China, Russia, and Africa; Canada focuses on Russia, China, and 
Latin America; and Australia and New Zealand mainly monitor Asia. However, intelligence 
sharing is not limited to their specified areas.7 
This level of information-sharing is based on an unparalleled degree of trust and confidence.  On 
a daily basis, a significant volume of finished SIGINT products is shared among the members of 
the Five Eyes alliance. Therefore, counterintelligence threats affecting individual members of the 
alliance can be extremely damaging to the alliance as a whole. Recently, for example, the director 
general of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police’s intelligence unit, Cameron Ortis, was charged 
with espionage—he had access to classified Five Eyes information.8 This caused major 
implications for US national security since Ortis had access to the alliance’s information. The leak 
poses a severe threat to US national security since the US routinely shares highly classified 
information with Canada. 
There are rumors of a “no-spy pact” between the Five Eyes members, though, none of which have 
been officially verified. However, there is a general understanding that there is no need to collect 
                                                            
6 Tossini, J. Vitor. “The Five Eyes - The Intelligence Alliance of the Anglosphere.” UK Defence Journal, 2017. 
7 Cox, James. “Canada and the Five Eyes Intelligence Community.” OpenCanada, December 18, 2012.  
8 Doherty, Ben. “Spy Scandal: Canada Reassures Allies over Leak That May Be Linked to Australian Drug Syndicate.” 
The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, 2019.  
on each other because of the extent of the intelligence sharing between them.9   
9 Eyes, 14 Eyes 
In addition to the Five Eyes, there are other known intelligence sharing alliances such as the Nine 
Eyes and the 14 Eyes. The Nine Eyes consists of the Five Eyes countries as well as Denmark, 
France, Holland, and Norway. The 14 Eyes consists of the Nine Eyes members, as well as 
Germany, Belgium, Italy, Sweden, and Spain. Each level of the alliances has different 
characteristics. Such as—the Five Eyes alliance has very extensive intelligence sharing and an 
alleged “no spy” contract between them. The Nine Eyes is not rumored to have the “no spy” pact, 
but does involve intelligence sharing, though, less than with the Five Eyes. The 14 Eyes involves 
a more limited amount of intelligence sharing than with the Nine Eyes or the Five Eyes members.  
Case Study: The United Arab Emirates  
US-UAE Relations 
The UAE is not officially a part of the Five Eyes, Nine Eyes, or 14 Eyes alliances, but according 
to CIA sources, the US and the UAE now allegedly hold a “no spy” agreement. The US and the 
UAE have had, what the US Department of State describes as, a “strong and friendly” relationship 
since the UAE’s independence from the United Kingdom in 1971. 10 At that time, the US was only 
the third country to establish relations with the UAE. In 1972, the US Embassy was established in 
Abu Dhabi, while the UAE Embassy was established in Washington, DC in 1974.11 Since official 
                                                            
9 Cox, James. “Canada And the Five Eyes Intelligence Community” Internet Archive, December 1, 2012. 
10 “U.S. Relations with United Arab Emirates - United States Department of State.” U.S. Department of State 
11 “Reliable Allies for 41 Years.” UAE Embassy in Washington, DC, Embassy of the United Arab Emirates 
diplomatic relations were established, bilateral cooperation between the two continued to grow. 
According to the US Department of State, “The United States and the UAE enjoy strong bilateral 
cooperation on a full range of issues including defense, non-proliferation, trade, law enforcement, 
energy policy, and cultural exchange.”12  
According to officials, the US and the UAE have built an alliance on the three pillars of security, 
prosperity, and a common outlook in the Middle East.13  The promotion of these pillars has created 
a sense of bilateral cooperation between the two states. 
Areas of Cooperation  
According to the UAE’s Embassy in the US, the two countries are committed to promoting peace 
and security within the Middle East in order to counter religious extremism and threats to regional 
stability.14 Each state’s military trains together and remains in regular coordination, as “UAE ports 
host more U.S. Navy ships than anywhere else outside the United States.”15 Over the last 25 years, 
the US and the UAE have partnered in many military coalition actions in order to further each 
states’ national security interests. The UAE supported the US role in the Tanker War in the 1980’s, 
the Somalian intervention in 1992, the Bosnia-Kosovo conflict in the 1990s,16 provided financial 
and logistical assistance to the US during Operation Desert Storm,17 supplied humanitarian aid for 
the US war in Afghanistan, and it supported US military actions in the War on Terrorism.18 In the 
                                                            
12 Ibid. 
13 “Key Areas of Bilateral Cooperation.” UAE Embassy in Washington, DC, Embassy of the United Arab Emirates 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
16 “Key Areas of Bilateral Cooperation.” UAE Embassy in Washington, DC, Embassy of the United Arab Emirates 
17 Ibid. 
18 Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. “In the UAE, the United States Has a Quiet, Potent Ally Nicknamed 'Little Sparta'.” The 
Washington Post. WP Company, November 9, 2014.  
War on Terrorism, the UAE focusses its efforts and counterterrorism operations against al Qaeda 
in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), who are mainly located in Yemen, with the support of the US. 
More recently, “the UAE has supported the Trump Administration policy of pressuring Iran 
economically, politically, and militarily.”19 
The US and the UAE have partnered to hinder the flow of funds, foreign fighters, and weapons to 
terrorist groups such as AQAP. At the same time, the UAE has criminalized terrorist groups using 
the internet to “promote their ideologies and finance their activities”.20 The UAE Embassy in the 
US argues that the two countries’ partnership promotes prosperity in the region and has led to 
exponential growth in trade and economic cooperation between them.  
Economically, the UAE is the US’ largest export market within the Middle East and North Africa 
region.21 Bilateral trade between the US and the UAE grew from $5.22 billion in 2004 to $24.5 
billion in 2018. Over the last decade, the UAE has purchased more than $20 billion in US defense 
hardware and services, making them one of the largest Foreign Military Sales customers of the 
US.22 Gathered from these numbers, the UAE has made significant investments in the US economy 
over the last 30 years. This has provided liquidity to US markets, supported growth for US 
companies, and aided job security for US workers.23 Additionally, on a smaller economic frame, 
more than 1,000 US firms operate in the country and frequently use the UAE as a regional base 
                                                            
19 “The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy.” Accessed November 30, 2019.  
20 Ibid. 
21 “U.S. Relations with United Arab Emirates.” U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of State, 4 Nov. 2019 
22 “Key Areas of Bilateral Cooperation.” UAE Embassy in Washington, DC, Embassy of the United Arab Emirates 
23 “Key Areas of Bilateral Cooperation.” UAE Embassy in Washington, DC, Embassy of the United Arab Emirates 
for business acquisition throughout the Middle East, North Africa, and Asia.24  
Alleged “No Spy” Contract with the UAE 
According to an article published by Reuters in 2019, the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
does not collect HUMINT on the UAE. This information has not been officially verified, but 
Reuters claimed that it obtained this information from former government officials, of which at 
least three served in the CIA.  
If the CIA’s “hands-off practice” with the UAE is indeed factual, it would put the UAE on an 
extremely short list of countries where the CIA allegedly takes a similar approach—namely, the 
four other members of the 5 Eyes Alliance: Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the UK. 
According to the former CIA sources, the US has CIA officers collecting HUMINT in almost 
every other country in the world.25 
However, according to the article, the US Intelligence Community (US IC) does not completely 
ignore the UAE. Allegedly, the NSA still collects electronic intelligence (ELINT) in the country, 
which is typically a lower-reward type of intelligence, whereas HUMINT can be the most valuable 
and difficult-to-obtain information. Since HUMINT is gathered using human sources, it can come 
with risks to those involved—but it can also produce extremely valuable intelligence regarding the 
intentions of specific targets. ELINT is collected through less risky channels, such as satellites, but 
it can be less rewarding because many countermeasures can be employed in order to avoid ELINT 
collection, and ELINT cannot collect the intentions of a target.  
                                                            
24 “U.S. Relations with United Arab Emirates.” U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of State, 4 Nov. 2019 
25 Ibid. 
The CIA, the NSA and the White House declined to comment on these alleged practices regarding 
the UAE. The UAE’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the US Embassy there also declined to 
comment.26 
UAE as a “Rogue State” 
Operating under the assumption that Reuters’ sources are correct and that there is a “no spy” 
agreement between the US and the UAE, many intelligence officials gave their opinions of why 
this agreement should be terminated. The main reason they used was that the UAE is commonly 
described as a “rogue state.” 
The UAE is an influential actor in the Middle East and beyond—it has been known to intervene in 
wars and regional politics. Additionally, many of these interventions have run counter to US 
policies. For example, the UAE finances the opposition to the UN-recognized government in 
Libya. The UAE is also involved in the economic blockade against Qatar. Intelligence officials 
argue through these examples that UAE actions are not always aimed at furthering peace and 
stability. 
In Sudan, the UAE secretly supported a coup on the former government of Omar al-Bashir, while 
they publicly supported Bashir and pledged $3 billion in assistance to Sudan that apparently never 
arrived at Sudan’s Central Bank. While the UAE’s role in this conflict may have contradicted US 
interests, officials did not solidify any diplomatic plans to end their involvement and instead 
released sharply worded statements condemning the violence while stating that “their hands were 
                                                            
26 Roston, Aram. “Why the CIA Doesn't Spy on the UAE.” Reuters, Thomson Reuters 
tied”.27 
In Yemen, the UAE aligned with Saudi Arabia in a coalition of nations fighting against the Iranian-
backed Houthi rebels. In order to counter Iran, the US backed the joint team of the UAE and Saudi 
Arabia in pressuring Iranian-backed rebels in Yemen. The UAE received international criticism 
for its role in the war and, worried its actions might entangle it into a war with Iran, pulled most 
of its troops out of Yemen and started to engage more with Iran.28 The US also spoke out against 
the UAE’s role in the Yemen war, over its use of air strikes in that have killed thousands of civilians 
and brought about a humanitarian crisis within the state. The US Congress enacted the War Powers 
Resolution in April of 2019 in order to halt the sale of arms to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, but US 
President Donald Trump vetoed the measure.29 In March of 2019, CNN reported that US weapons 
sold to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and the coalition were transferred to al-Qaeda linked fighters within 
Yemen. This violated the terms of the arms sales between the US and the UAE.30 It also 
contradicted the US-UAE diplomatic relationship as a pillar of security in the Middle East and 
Africa.  
The UAE also aided a Libyan military campaign, headed by Khalifa Haftar, aiming to topple 
Libya’s United Nations-recognized government, the Government of National Accord (GNA). The 
UAE’s aid in Libya included intelligence sharing, media support, and political and financial 
backing. The UAE’s military was direct involved in the conflict through the use of air bombs and 
                                                            
27 Lynch, Justin, and Robbie Gramer. “Arab States Foment Sudan Chaos While U.S. Stands By.” Foreign Policy, 
Foreign Policy, 8 July 2019 
28 Ibid.  
29 Younes, Ali. “Analysis: The Divergent Saudi-UAE Strategies in Yemen.” UAE News | Al Jazeera, Al Jazeera, 31 
Aug. 2019 
30 Elbagir, Nima, et al. “US Arms Sold to Saudi Arabia and UAE End up in Wrong Hands.” CNN, Cable News 
Network 
the supply of military weapons, aircraft, and vehicles to the Haftar forces. These actions violated 
a UN arms embargo on Libya and significantly strengthened Khalifa Haftar’s movement.31 The 
US’ position on this involvement was again one of ambiguity as Washington officially supported 
the GNA.32 
Abroad, the UAE has started to form strategic ties with Russia and China. These ties have included 
strategic partnerships for cooperation on security, trade, and oil markets. The UAE and China 
signed multiple memorandums of understanding (MoU) and announced sixteen total agreements 
that would be enacted within the states. These agreements have included the increase of bilateral 
trade and the UAE’s defense spending in China’s weaponized drone market.33  
Also running counter to US interests, the UAE and Russia have held conversations regarding joint 
cooperation for international issues of shared interest. Much like the UAE’s partnership with 
China, many direct visits have been made between the two states’ leaders. The two countries 
signed a declaration for cooperation on political, economic, cultural, and security issues. In 2017, 
the UAE awarded a $708 million contract to the Russian agency, Rosoboron export, for anti-armor 
missiles. Trade between these two states, after this agreement, had increased from $161 million in 
2015 to $217 million in 2017.34 
Because the US allegedly does not collect HUMINT on the UAE, it may not know what the UAE’s 
                                                            
31 El-Gamaty, Guma. “Qatar, the UAE and the Libya Connection.” Libya | Al Jazeera, Al Jazeera, 12 June 2017 
32 Malsin, Jared. “Libya's Tripoli Government Blames U.A.E. for Deadly Airstrike.” The Wall Street Journal, Dow 
Jones & Company, 4 July 2019 
33 Salles, Marcus. “US Alliance with Gulf Decays as UAE Strengthens Ties with China and Russia.” Modern 
Diplomacy, Modern Diplomacy, 5 Aug. 2019 
34 Salles, Marcus. “US Alliance with Gulf Decays as UAE Strengthens Ties with China and Russia.” Modern 
Diplomacy, Modern Diplomacy, 5 Aug. 2019 
intentions are. In regions like Sudan, Yemen, and Libya, the UAE could be further involved in 
activities that run counter to US interests. As shown in these examples, the UAE has run counter 
to US policies at times, and not knowing the UAE’s intentions could possibly create a dangerous 
intelligence gap, according to the aforementioned intelligence officials.   
US Intelligence Collection on European Allies 
Germany 
Other than the Five Eyes members, the US has been caught collecting on other European allies. 
One of the most recent and largely covered examples of this includes allegations of the US 
intercepting communications of Germany’s Chancellor, Angela Merkel.35 The National Security 
Agency allegedly tapped these communications from Angela Merkel, her closest advisors, her 
predecessors, and 69 other top German officials.  
US President Barack Obama described the US and Germany as “inseparable allies,”36 but the two 
countries continued to spy on each other. Since the election of US President Donald Trump, 
however, the US and Germany seem to be disagreeing more on key policies—Trump pulled the 
US out of the JCPOA, but Germany continued to support it; Trump has accused Germany of 
targeting the US with “unfair economic policies,”37 and there is increased criticism from the US 
over Germany’s plan for a gas pipeline with Russia. The US imposed sanctions on the German 
                                                            
35 Connolly, Kate. “Germany Summons US Ambassador over New Spying Claims.” The Guardian. Guardian News 
and Media, July 2, 2015. 
36 Berlin, Reuters in. “NSA Tapped German Chancellery for Decades, WikiLeaks Claims.” The Guardian. Guardian 
News and Media, July 8, 2015. 
37 Deutsche Welle. “US-German Conflicts - What You Need to Know: DW: 11.06.2018.” DW.COM. Accessed 
December 24, 2019. 
companies constructing the Russian natural gas pipeline. These sanctions were met with strong 
opposition from both Germany and the European Union.38 
In addition to these disagreements, there have been cases that have made collecting intelligence 
on Germany arguably critical to US national security—for example, the need for intelligence on 
the 9/11 hijackers who planned their attacks while they were in Germany.39 The cell of al-Qaeda 
operatives based in Hamburg, Germany included Mohamed Atta, who was the leader of the four 
hijacking teams for 9/11. German intelligence agencies were allegedly tracking them since 1998, 
and some American analysts claim that the Germans missed critical evidence that could have 
stopped the attacks.40 
Austria 
Another example of the US collecting on its allies is Austria. Austria is a NATO member and 
according to the US State Department, “The US and Austria share many common values and 
common perspectives, including a support for human rights…and a shared vision of peace and 
freedom for all.”41  
However, Austria’s government is internationally accused of being pro-Russia. The Freedom Party 
(FPO), the previously ruling far-right party in Austria, and Vladimir Putin’s United Russia party 
                                                            
38 Schmitz, Rob. “Germany Reacts To U.S. Sanctions On Gas Pipeline.” NPR, NPR, 19 Dec. 2019,  
39 Frantz, Douglas, and Desmond Butler. “GERMANS LAY OUT EARLY QAEDA TIES TO 9/11 HIJACKERS.” The New York 
Times. The New York Times, August 24, 2002. 
40 Butler, Desmond. “Germans Were Tracking Sept. 11 Conspirators as Early as 1998, Documents Disclose.” The New 
York Times. The New York Times, January 18, 2003. 
41 “U.S. Relations with Austria - United States Department of State.” U.S. Department of State. U.S. Department of 
State.  
held a formal cooperation agreement together. 
Earlier this year, the Austrian government collapsed because of a leaked video showing a leading 
party member of the FPO offering “lucrative public contracts in exchange for campaign support” 
from the niece of a Russian oligarch.42 The accused party members resigned, and snap elections 
were held. The FPO did not get re-elected in the most recent elections in September.  
Recently, in response to Austria’s government and intelligence services taking a more “eastern” 
and pro-Russian approach, UK and Dutch intelligence agencies have “heavily restricted the 
amount of intelligence they share with Austria,” out of fear that Austria might leak western 
intelligence to Russia.43  
Historically, Vienna has been named the world’s largest espionage hub because of its location 
between “East and West.”44 Vienna reportedly has “the highest density of [foreign intelligence] 
agents in the world”.45 Therefore, it is highly likely that the US has an intelligence presence there 
as well. In 2015, Austria filed a legal complaint over US spying suspicions. It claims that the NSA 
spied on Austrian authorities and defense firms.46 
France 
The US has also spied on France, even though the US State Department describes US-French 
                                                            
42 Oltermann, Philip. “Austrian Government Collapses after Far-Right Minister Fired.” The Guardian. Guardian News 
and Media, May 20, 2019. 
43 “UK, Dutch Spy Agencies Curb Intel Flow to Austria over Russia Ties: MP.” Reuters. Thomson Reuters, April 9, 2019. 
44 Schwab, Philippe. “Spy-Hub Vienna: Secret Agents Flock to Vienna - WELT.” DIE WELT. WELT, November 17, 2011.  
45 Ibid. 
46 “Austria Files Legal Complaint over German-U.S. Spying Suspicions.” Reuters. Thomson Reuters, May 5, 2015. 
relations as “active and friendly,”47 and that the two countries share “common values and have 
parallel policies on most political, economic, and security issues.”48 Additionally, the US and 
France are two of five permanent members of the UN Security Council. 
The US and France are rivals in economic and trade relations and have disagreed on some major 
policies. At the recent NATO Summit in London, Trump and Macron (the French President) 
clashed over the role of NATO, Turkey’s role in Syria, and over Islamic State (IS) fighters.49 
Another key policy causing controversy between the two countries is the continued French support 
for the JCPOA after the US withdrew from it last year. 
In 1975, French companies allegedly began supplying nuclear hardware to Iran under the Shah’s 
regime.50 This agreement between France and Iran created the company SOFIDIF. Uranium 
enrichment in France is conducted by the international EURODIF group. Through SOFIDIF, Iran 
put up over US $1 billion in 1975 – taking over a 10% share in EURODIF. In return, Iran was to 
receive 10% of the produced enriched uranium.51 
As of 2006, “SOFIDIF still exists, still holds the same share in EURODIF and is still active.”52 
Therefore, 10% of EURODIF is still held by Iran. In other words, “Iran makes considerable 
amounts of money in dividends – tens of millions of euros per year.”53 
                                                            
47 “U.S. Relations with France - United States Department of State.” U.S. Department of State. U.S. Department of 
State. 
48 Ibid. 
49 “Nato Summit: Trump and Macron Clash in London.” BBC News. BBC, December 3, 2019.  
50 Vaez, Ali, and Karim Sadjadpour. Iran’s Nuclear Odyssey: Costs and Risks. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 2013. pg. 14 
51 Schneider, Mycle. “Nuclear France Abroad - NIRS,” May 2009. pg. 20 
52 Ibid. 20. 
53Ibid. 5. 
The US has a strong support for nonproliferation in Iran. These allegations of French companies 
supplying nuclear hardware to Iran form the argument that collecting intelligence within this US 
ally was critical to US national security. 
These examples show that the US has, in the past, gained supposedly valuable intelligence by 
collecting on its European allies. Even though these allies are considered “western” countries and 
have similar interests, the US still collects on them. Is the US missing out on more valuable 
intelligence by not collecting on other allies in Europe, such as those in the Five Eyes Alliance?   
US Collection on Non-European Allies 
Saudi Arabia 
Even though the US is allegedly not spying on the UAE, the CIA is reportedly operating within 
the territory of its neighbor, Saudi Arabia. The UAE and Saudi Arabia are both considered US 
allies. Both of these countries are important oil producers, large consumers of US weapons, and 
highly influential in the region. However, the US allegedly only conducts HUMINT operations in 
one of these countries—Saudi Arabia.54 
The US does consider Saudi Arabia an important ally in the region. Saudi Arabia provides the US 
with oil and increased influence in the region, while the US provides Saudi with security, arms, 
and access to global markets.55 US President Donald Trump has been an advocate for better 
relations and cooperation with Saudi Arabia. However, US-Saudi relations have been increasingly 
                                                            
54 Roston, Aram. “Why the CIA Doesn't Spy on the UAE.” Reuters. Thomson Reuters, August 26, 2019.  
55 Danephron. “Resetting the U.S. Relationship with Saudi Arabia.” Foreign Policy, September 23, 2019. 
criticized in America and the international community. Allegations that Saudi Arabia is backing 
elements within al-Qaeda and ISIS and the fact that 15 of the 19 hijackers in the 9/11 attacks were 
Saudi citizens, Saudi Arabia using US weapons in the ongoing war and humanitarian crisis in 
Yemen, and now the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, have all posed strains on the alliance.56 
The US IC also uses these reasons to justify spying and collecting on Saudi Arabia. 
The US IC trains many foreign intelligence agencies in order to establish and maintain ties to 
foreign partners. However, because of “fears that the kingdom doesn’t yet have proper safeguards 
to prevent lawless covert operations like the killing last year of Post contributing columnist Jamal 
Khashoggi,” the US has rejected a plan to train the General Intelligence Presidency (GIP), the 
Saudi intelligence service that is tasked with external intelligence,.57 
After the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi last year, Mohammad bin Salman (MBS), 
the Saudi Crown Prince, has announced the restructuring of Saudi’s intelligence agencies. These 
changes include creating four new intelligence departments and reorganizing the existing 
organizational structures in order to account for any further gaps.58 However, even after the alleged 
restructuring of their services, the US claims that it would be more of a risk than a benefit to train 
their intelligence services. This points to distrust between the two countries’ respective intelligence 
communities.  
Also contributing to distrust between the countries are Saudi Arabia’s extensive intelligence 
                                                            
56 “U.S.-Saudi Arabia Relations.” Council on Foreign Relations. Council on Foreign Relations. 
57 Ignatius, David. “Opinion | Why the State Department Rejected a Plan to Train Saudi Intelligence.” The Washington 
Post. WP Company, December 12, 2019. 
58 “Saudi Crown Prince Presides over Committee to Restructure Intelligence Agency: SPA.” Reuters. Thomson 
Reuters, October 25, 2018. 
collection activities within the US. In 2019, the Human Rights Council of the UN released a report 
on the murder of Jamal Khashoggi. In this report, it was revealed that when Khashoggi was seeking 
refuge in the US, Saudi Arabia conducted intelligence gathering operations that targeted him. In 
another example, in November 2019, US prosecutors alleged that “Saudi officials coordinated an 
effort to recruit Twitter employees to look up the private data of thousands of Twitter accounts.”59 
Saudi Arabia was allegedly trying to gain access to Saudi government critics and journalists. Two 
Saudi citizens and one Saudi official was charged. In another case of Saudi Arabia’s intelligence 
collection operations conducted inside the US was Saudi Arabia’s hacking of Jeff Bezos’ phone. 
Jeff Bezos, Amazon billionaire and owner of the Washington Post, had his phone hacked after 
allegedly receiving a WhatsApp message from MBS himself. According to the investigation, the 
Washington Post owner was targeted five months before murder of Jamal Khashoggi, who was an 
analyst for the Washington Post.60 
Turkey 
Turkey is another example of the US conducting HUMINT operations on one of its allies in the 
region. Turkey is a NATO ally and an ally to the US. However, in recent years, Turkey has opposed 
US foreign policy objectives on numerous occasions. Subsequently, relations between the US and 
Turkey have become more tense. 
Turkey has been accused of allegedly backing elements within al-Qaeda and the Islamic States 
since 2012. Turkish recruiters for these Islamist organizations were relatively open with their 
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activities. The Islamic State was able to link itself to Turkish networks that contributed to 
smuggling jihadists to Syria—taking advantage of the open border between Turkey and Syria. 
Turkey only started cracking down on Islamic State networks within the country in 2015, during 
the Islamic State’s massive territorial gain in Syria and Iraq.61  
More recently, in July 2019, Turkey received a shipment of Russian weaponry after strong 
objections from the US. The US opposes this because it places Russian arms into a NATO ally’s 
control. This adds to the existing idea that Turkey is “drifting off into a non-Western alternative.”62 
In response, the Trump administration suspended certain arms sales and trainings to Turkey. The 
latest example of Turkey opposing US foreign policy, however, was Turkey’s incursion into 
Kurdish-held northern Syria. The US had backed the Syrian Kurds in their fight against ISIS since 
2014. Turkey announced its entrance into Kurdish territory as soon as the US announced it would 
withdraw its troops from the region—this marked the beginning of a battle between two US 
allies.63  
Israel  
Israel is perhaps the most extensive example of US HUMINT collection on an “ally” in the region. 
According to the US State Department, “Israel has long been, and remains, America’s most reliable 
partner in the Middle East.”64 However, there is an extremely long history of CIA activities and 
collection operations targeting Israel, and a long history of Mossad targeting the US. In an article 
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published by the CIA, it states that spying among these two “friends” is more common than citizens 
might think.65  
In 1985, Jonathan Pollard, a US Navy intelligence analyst, was arrested by the FBI for giving Israel 
classified US information. Pollard remains the only American to receive a life sentence for spying 
for an American ally.66 Before this, in 1982, the CIA had allegedly attempted to “penetrate Israel’s 
military intelligence community.” 
In more recent years, the US has maintained an internationally controversial “pro-Israel” stance in 
the region since the election of US President Donald Trump, who moved the US Embassy from 
Tel Aviv to Jerusalem and declared that Israeli settlements in West Bank are no longer inconsistent 
with international law.  
Despite the seemingly closer relationship, in September 2019, there were reports from Washington 
DC saying that Israel “placed cellphone surveillance devices in sensitive locations around 
Washington, including near the White House.”67 However, Israel denied these reports and US 
President Donald Trump also refused to believe them. 
In the past and in recent times, the US has collected extensively on its allies in and around the 
Middle East. These examples indicate how the US prefers to collect on influential actors in the 
region, even if they are considered important and strategic allies. This raises the question—If the 
UAE falls into this description, why is the US allegedly not collecting on it? Furthermore, is the 
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lack of intelligence on the UAE threatening US national security interests? 
Case Study: CIA Front Company, “Crypto AG” 
On February 11th, 2020, the Washington Post published a groundbreaking article entitled “The 
Intelligence Coup of the Century.”68 The article detailed the company known as “Crypto AG,” 
and exposed it as a CIA front company. This event serves as an important case study that can 
illustrate just how in-depth CIA HUMINT collection is, on both allies and adversaries.  
Background 
Crypto AG was not always a CIA front company. It was founded after WWII by Boris Hagelin 
who was interested in making encryption devices. Hagelin was a Russian man who fled Russia 
for the US in 1940 due to the war—after the war ended, he left for Switzerland to start his new 
company, Crypto AG. The relationship between Crypto AG and the CIA evolved over a long 
period of time.   
It started after World War II, when the CIA caught wind of what Hagelin was producing in 
Switzerland. The encryption devices he sold were not as elaborate as the Enigma machines being 
used in Germany during WWII, but they were hand-powered and portable, making it easier for 
troops to use. Soon after that, the CIA was able to recruit Hagelin as an asset—he had an affinity 
for the US after having lived there and he also wanted its business for his new company. 
Therefore, in exchange for the US’ business, Hagelin agreed to only sell his best equipment to 
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countries who were preapproved by the US, only if the US government would reimburse him for 
his lost revenue.  
Then, in the mid-1960s, the deal between the CIA and Hagelin evolved. The CIA, now operating 
in coordination with the NSA, and Hagelin came to a new agreement in which the US 
government was allowed to alter and make changes to his machines. Crypto AG then came out 
with a new electronic model of the decryption devices that were mostly designed by the NSA.  
Soon after this, however, the deal between the CIA and Hagelin again underwent changes. At a 
certain point, the CIA and NSA decided to take it a step further and make two versions of each 
model: a secure version for US allies, and less secure versions for non-US allies.  
Crypto AG became a “dominant maker of encryption devices for decades, navigating waves of 
technology from mechanical gears to electronic circuits and, finally, silicon chips and 
software.”69 The Switzerland-based company made millions of dollars and sold its (different, 
depending on if the customer was an ally or not) encryption devices to over 120 countries. They 
included Iran, military juntas in South America, India and Pakistan, and even the Vatican.  
However, none of its customers knew that the company was run by the CIA. At times, “Crypto 
accounted for roughly 40 percent of the diplomatic cables and other transmissions by foreign 
governments that cryptanalysts at the NSA decoded and mined for intelligence.”70 There were 
some suspicions of the company, but none had been proved or made public until the Washington 
Post published its article.  
                                                            
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid. 
The front company lasted for decades and was an extremely valuable asset to the US. It allowed 
the US to gain certain intelligence access, such as monitoring Iranian mullahs during the 1979 
hostage crisis, giving critical intelligence to Britain regarding Argentina’s military during the 
Falklands War, tracking the assassination attempts among South American dictators, and even 
catching Libyan government officials talking about their responsibility for the 1986 bombing of 
a Berlin disco. It is not certain if or at what time the CIA ended its involvement with the 
company.  
Analysis 
The CIA’s involvement with Crypto AG went through different stages. At the beginning, it was 
not looking to actively collect intelligence on other countries. Instead, it created a “Denial 
Operation,” an operation that was “designed to prevent adversaries from acquiring weapons or 
technology that would give them an advantage.”71 The CIA and Crypto AG’s founder agreed that 
it would only sell encryption devices to US-approved countries—countries that were US allies.  
However, after the denial operation had been successful for a number of years, the CIA and 
Crypto AG decided to evolve their original agreement into an “active measure operation,” where 
they were “actively selling devices that were engineered to betray their buyers.”72 
The CIA sold this equipment to 120 countries, to both allies and non-allies. According to the 
article published by the Washington Post, however, there were select countries that knew about 
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the CIA’s involvement—allegedly, the Five Eyes knew, as well as Switzerland and Germany.  
It is clear that the US actively collected large amounts of intelligence on its non-allies abroad, 
but it is not clear to what extent the US collected on its allies. The US had easier access to allied 
information through this company, but did the US use it? 
The Argument: Should the US Collect Intelligence on its Close Allies Abroad? 
The United States does not collect intelligence against all countries with the same intensity. 
Members of the so-called 5 Eyes alliance are believed to be excluded—there are rumors of a “no-
spy” agreement between the members, though, none of the rumors have been officially verified. 
Other than the members of this alliance, and now, allegedly, the UAE, the US still collects on its 
other close allies all around the world according to retired CIA intelligence officials.  
The Argument Against Collection 
Assuming that the rumors are true, and that the US does have “no spy” contracts with certain 
countries (the UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and now, allegedly, the UAE), there are 
various strategic reasons why the US would choose to agree to these alliances.   
The most important reason for these types of contracts is trust. When the US agrees not to spy on 
another country, it expects that country to do the same and reciprocate these non-collection 
activities for the US. Therefore, within the 5 Eyes alliance, the idea that the US does not collect 
HUMINT on Canada, the UK, New Zealand, and Australia comes with the expectation that 
Canada, the UK, New Zealand, and Australia do not collect HUMINT on the US.  
Additionally, this gesture can build trust between the member countries and encourage greater 
intelligence sharing and cooperation. For example, a 5 Eyes member may have strategic 
connections with specific national security interests that the US does not have access to. By 
building this trust, the US may be able to gain important intelligence otherwise unattainable 
through the other 5 Eyes member. Furthermore, if an ally were to catch another ally spying on it, 
it could severely damage trust and relations between the two countries—both in the world of 
intelligence and the world of diplomacy.  
The Argument for Collection 
The sections above listed many examples of the US collecting on its “close allies.” Each of these 
examples contain different reasons of why the US argues that it should collect intelligence on its 
allies.  
In the case of Germany, part of the 14 Eyes alliance and a NATO member, its intelligence agencies 
failed to detect and stop the 9/11 hijackers who planned their attacks while they were in Germany. 
Collecting on allies abroad can be beneficial if those allies’ intelligence agencies drop the ball.  
As for Austria, a NATO member, its government has become extensively tied to Russia. Because 
of this, many western countries have stopped sharing intelligence with Austria out of fear it will 
share it with Russia. In this case, the US argues that if it does not collect intelligence on its allies, 
there would be an extreme lack of intelligence if the ally turns into an adversary. Additionally, if 
the ally does turn into an adversary, would they share US intelligence with others? 
France is a 9 Eyes member as well as a NATO member and its government has worked closely to 
US interests. However, businesses within France have been known to sell nuclear hardware to Iran. 
Here, the US makes the case that, although governments of allies might work to US interests, there 
may be private sector activities within the country that are going against US interests.  
Saudi Arabia and Israel are two examples of strategic alliances in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia 
provides the US with oil and increased influence in the region, while the US provides Saudi with 
security, arms, and access to global markets. Israel shares intelligence with the US on national 
security threats within the Middle East. However, both Saudi Arabia and Israel spy on the US 
extensively. Saudi Arabia has spied on the US when it came to the case of Khashoggi, has spied 
on US twitter users, and hacked the phone of Jeff Bezos. Israel has penetrated the US government 
and has stolen extensive amounts of intelligence. Therefore, the US makes the case that it should 
collect on allies because those allies might be collecting on the US.  
Finally, Turkey, a NATO member, has just purchased a shipment of Russian weaponry after strong 
objections from the US. The US’ takeaway from this case is that it should collect on allies because, 
when it comes to defense, every country has its own policy and may go against US interests.  
A major thing to note is that there have been no known policy-damaging examples like these 
involving the 5 Eyes members.   
Analysis 
Not spying on allies abroad and sharing intelligence with them builds trust and cooperation. 
However, this can also lead to dangerous intelligence gaps and information leaks.  
The 5 Eyes alliance, however, proves that it is worth the risk. Intelligence sharing between the now 
5 Eyes countries dates back to the World Wars, where intelligence sharing between these allied 
countries was commonplace. Historically, they have been the US’ oldest and most trusted allies. 
There are no known instances of dangerous intelligence gaps from not collecting on them, no 
known cases of them spying on each other, and extensive examples of the benefits they have reaped 
from sharing intelligence with each other. It is clear that there is a high level of trust and 
cooperation between the members. 
Of course, the 5 Eyes alliance still comes with risks. With the extensive level of intelligence 
sharing between the 5 countries, a leak in one country’s system can leak intelligence from all 5 
countries. For example, the Cambridge Spies were a ring of Soviet spies that worked inside both 
MI6 and US intelligence agencies in order to give information to the Soviet Union. There was an 
example of this more recently in Canada—a man with access to 5 Eyes intelligence was just 
charged with espionage for giving its classified information away. However, these are risks that 
could happen to any country even if the alliance was not in place.  
Overall, the 5 Eyes alliance is trustworthy. However, extending this “no spy” and intelligence 
sharing alliance is when problems seem to arise because, as shown in this paper, even the US’ 
close allies have spied on it and have run counter to its interests at times.  
The newest and perhaps most important example of the US trying to extend this alliance and 
potentially causing problems is the UAE’s alleged addition to the 5 Eyes. Therefore, the US 
allegedly does not spy on the UAE. Because of this and the UAE’s controversial extensive 
involvement in the rest of the world, there are critics who claim that not collecting intelligence on 
the UAE is creating a dangerous and possibly expanding knowledge gap—that America is missing 
out on critical pieces of intelligence.   
The US and the UAE have had historically strong and friendly relations. Economically, the UAE 
is the US’ largest export market within the Middle East and North Africa region. Militarily, the 
UAE and the US enjoy strong cooperation, as the UAE ports host more US Navy ships than 
anywhere else outside the United States. This fact could be due to a number of things: the US’ 
interest in oil in the region, or, especially recently with renewed tensions between the US and Iran, 
security purposes in the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman.  
Though the US and UAE have strong relations, critics within the US IC claim that, because the 
UAE acts as a “rogue state” within the region, the US is creating a dangerous intelligence gap by 
not collecting on it. For example, In Sudan, the UAE supported a coup on the former government 
of Omar al-Bashir, it has taken a leading role in the war in Yemen, it has aided in the overthrow 
of the UN-recognized government in Libya, and it has begun to increase relations with Russia and 
China. All of these are examples of how the UAE’s interests seem to be diverting from the US’.  
National security experts have stated that diplomatic ties and an alignment of national interests has 
been enough to excuse the lack of intelligence collection on the UAE. Others believe, though, that 
the UAE is moving past the focus of partnership and exchange with the US and towards a focus 
of self-preservation in an effort to strengthen their monarchy. If the US spies on some of its closest 
allies, such as Germany and France, why does it allegedly not do so on the UAE? 
Conclusion 
Despite the existing and possible risks, the 5 Eyes has proven to be a productive and valuable 
intelligence sharing and, allegedly, “no spying” alliance. It is clear that there is a high level of trust 
and cooperation between members. However, issues have risen when trying to extend this level of 
trust to other allies, as listed before in examples such as Germany, France, Austria, etc... Now that 
the UAE has allegedly been added to the extremely short “no spy” list, it raises the question of 
worth. Increasing cooperation between the US and UAE could prove to be valuable, but it also 
opens the door to possibly threaten US national security interests.  
The question of “Should the US Collect Intelligence on its Close Allies?” is extremely difficult to 
research and analyze. The part that made this topic so difficult was the extreme lack of information. 
Very little information is not classified when it comes to how the US conducts intelligence 
operations abroad. There is hardly any publicly available information on the Five Eyes alliance in 
general, and only a few people within the US IC have stated that the US does not collect on the 
UAE. Therefore, the analyses on these subjects were made with the assumption that the small 
number of available sources were accurate.  
Of course, there is no clear or correct answer to this question. Even within the US IC—to those 
who hold the clearance level to make more informed opinions—there are varying outlooks and 
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